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UTAH SUPREME COURT

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Case No.

Appellee/Respondent,
v.

Category 13
DENNIS SHOULDERBLADE,
Appellant/Petitioner.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Did the court of appeals commit plain error in its failure to address the

issue of attenuation between an illegal stop and voluntary consent?
2.

Was petitioner denied his state and federal constitutional right to

effective assistance of counsel by appellate counsel's failure to raise the issue of the
lack of attenuation between the illegal stop and the voluntary consent in petitioner's
first appeal of right?
OPINION BELOW
The court of appeal's opinion was issued on March 19, 1992, in State v.
Shoulderblade,

Utah Adv. Rep.

(Utah App. 1992). The appeal of the co-

defendant was also issued on March 19, 1992, in State v. Small. 182 Utah Adv. Rep.
55 (Utah App. 1992). Copies of both opinions are contained in the addendum.

1

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This court has jurisdiction to consider this petition for writ of certiorari pursuant
to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2 (1953 as amended).
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution,
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons of things to be seized.
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution,
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right . . . to have the assistance of counsel for his
defense.
Article I, Section 12 of the Constitution of Utah:
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the
right to appear and defend in person and by counsel . . .
and the right to appeal in all cases.
Article I, Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall
issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or
affirmation, particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the person or thing to be seized.

2

Utah Code Ann. §77-1-6 (1953 as amended):
(1)

In criminal prosecutions the defendant is entitled:
(a)
to appear in person and defend in person or by
counsel, . . .
(g)

to the right to appeal in all cases.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Petitioner and the co-defendant, Lemuel T. Small, were jointly charged in a
twelve count information alleging the commission of six felonies and six
misdemeanors. (R. 3)

Ultimately, petitioner was tried on a three count amended

information alleging two counts of Possession of a Controlled Substance with Intent
to Distribute (methamphetamine and marijuana) and one count of Possession of a
Controlled Substance (cocaine). (R. 150-151) The charges arose out of a roadblock
stop and subsequent search of a vehicle in which petitioner was driving and Small
was the passenger. Prior to trial, petitioner and Small made motions to suppress the
evidence seized as a result of the search of the vehicle. (R. 26-29) It was alleged that
the evidence was seized in violation of Article I, Section 14 of the Constitution of
Utah and the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
(R. 88-131)

In a written order, the motions to suppress were denied. (R. 68-71)

Petitioner and Small were jointly tried and convicted by a jury. (R. 195) Petitioner was
sentenced to serve a indeterminate term of not less than one nor more than fifteen

3

years in the state prison for the conviction of count I of the information. Concurrent
five year sentences were imposed for the convictions of counts 2 and 3. (R. 281-285)
Both petitioner and Small appealed their convictions to the Utah Court of
Appeals. (R. 273-274, 304-305) The two had separate counsel and briefs were filed
independently. However, the two cases were argued on the same date before the
same panel of judges. In both cases, the court held that the roadblock stop of the
vehicle violated the fourth amendment. Likewise, in both cases, the court of appeals
found that there was a voluntary consent to the search of the vehicle. However,
counsel for Small argued that any consent was not sufficiently attenuated from the
illegal roadblock to dissipate the taint of that roadblock. Based on that argument, the
court of appeals reversed Small's conviction. Counsel for petitioner did not raise the
attenuation argument. The court of appeals affirmed petitioner's conviction because
the attenuation argument was not raised by counsel.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THIS COURT SHOULD ADOPT THE "PLAIN ERROR" OR
"EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES" RULE IN REVIEWING
APPELLATE PROCEEDINGS IN THE LOWER COURT.
The trial court ruled that the roadblock in question did not violate the fourth
amendment or Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution. On appeal, the state
conceded that the roadblock violated the fourth amendment. Petitioner's prior counsel
failed to argue that there was insufficient attenuation between the voluntary consent

4

and the illegal stop. In its opinion affirming the conviction, the court of appeals did
specifically address this issue. The court stated,
Shoulderblade did not argue before the trial court, or
before this court, that the consent given to search the
vehicle was involuntary, or that it was insufficiently
attenuated from the illegal roadblock to justify the search.
As the State points out, while a non-attenuation argument
was unavailable to Shoulderblade in the trial court,
because, as acknowledged in State v. Sims, 808 P.2d 141,
150 (Utah App. 1991), cert, pending, "then-standing
decisions effectively held that a non-coerced search
consent, by itself, purged the taint of a primary illegality,"
id. at 150, the argument was available when this case was
briefed for appeal. However, Shoulderblade has failed to
articulate such an argument before this court.
Therefore, in light of the trial court's uncontested
finding that consent was given to search the vehicle, we
affirm the trial court's denial of Shoulderblade's motion to
suppress on the ground that the challenged evidence was
obtained during a valid consent search, [footnote omitted]
(Slip opinion at pp. 3-4)
The co-defendant's appeal was based on the same suppression issues. Small raised
the attenuation issue and argued this court's ruling in State v. Arrovo, 796 P.2d 684
(Utah, 1990). The opposite conclusion was reached by the court of appeals. In State
v. Small, supra, the court ruled,
The conclusion that there was voluntary consent
does not end our inquiry as we must also determine if the
consent was untainted by the prior illegality. [State v.1
Castner, 179 Utah Adv. Rep. [11] at 14 (Utah App. 1992).
"We examine several factors to determine if there has been
an exploitation of a prior illegality: temporal proximity of
the illegality and the evidence sought to be suppressed, the
presence of intervening factors, and the purpose and

5

flagrancy of the misconduct." id.; accord Sims, 808 P.2d
at 150; Arrovo. 796 P.2d at 690-91 n.4.
This case is indistinguishable from Sims. The record
demonstrates a very short period of time elapsed between
Small's stop at the roadblock and Officer Whatcott's
request to search. As for intervening factors, none exist.
The consent was obtained during the ongoing illegal
roadblock stop. On the uncontroverted facts before us, we
conclude that Small's consent to have the vehicle searched
was not sufficiently attenuated to dissipate the taint of the
illegal roadblock.
182 Utah Adv. Rep. at 57.
To avoid such in inequitable results this court should adopt a "plain error" or
"exceptional circumstances" rule in appellate review.

The "plain error" rule has

generally been held to be applicable to appellate review of trial proceedings, rather
than the review of an appellate decision. However, the nature of the plain error rule
and its purposes are applicable to appellate proceedings. In State v. Eldredae, 773
P.2d 29 (Utah 1989), the court described the requirements of the plain error rule
stating,
The first requirement for a finding of plain error is
that the error be "plain," i.e., from our examination of the
record, we must be able to say that it should have been
obvious to a trial court that it was committing error,
[citations omitted]
The second and somewhat interrelated requirement
for a finding of plain error is that the error affect the
substantial rights of the accused, i.e., that the error be
harmful, [footnote omitted]
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773 P.2d at 35. In State v. Emmett. 184 Utah Adv. Rep. 34 (Utah 1992), this court
discussed the purpose of the rule:
This court reviews allegations of plain error despite
the lack of timely objection, provided, of course, that the
trial court was not led into error. We do so in order to
avoid manifest injustice and because, if the error is obvious,
the trial court has the opportunity to address the error
regardless of the fact that it was never brought to the
court's attention, [footnote omitted]
184 Utah Adv. Rep. at 35.
In this case, it is obvious that the error in refusing to address the attenuation
issue was plain. That issue was raised in the court of appeals' written opinion.
Obviously, the court of appeals had both the awareness of and the opportunity to
address this issue. Second, the error in refusing to address the issue was harmful.
The attenuation issue was raised in the co-defendant's appeal. That issue was the
basis for the reversal of Small's conviction. The error in refusing to address this issue
is obviously harmful as petitioner's conviction was affirmed and the co-defendant's
conviction was reversed based on the same incident.

This court should grant

certiorari to review the decision of the court of appeals on the issue of whether that
court committed plain error in refusing to address the issue of the attenuation
between the illegal roadblock stop and the voluntary consent to the search the vehicle
that petitioner was driving.
The purpose of the "unusual" or "exceptional" circumstances rule is also to
prevent "manifest injustice", State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920 (Utah App. 1991).

7

In employing this analysis the courts focus on the reason for failing to raise an issue
and the effect of that failure on the case.1 In this case manifest injustice certainly
resulted from failure to raise the attenuation issue. The reason for the failure to make
the argument can be attributed to ineffective assistance of counsel.2 This court
should grant the petition to review this as well as the plain error issue.
POINT II
COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO RAISE THE ISSUE OF THE LACK
OF ATTENUATION BETWEEN THE ILLEGAL STOP AND
THE VOLUNTARY CONSENT DENIED PETITIONER HIS
RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF APPELLATE
COUNSEL.
It is appropriate for this court to review the issue of ineffective assistance of
counsel on appeal in this proceeding. In State v. Humphries, 818 P.2d 1027 (Utah
1991), the court held that the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel at trial may
be raised for the first time on appeal. This court found that judicial economy is best
served by addressing the issue without further proceedings in the lower court if two
conditions are met. First, the record must be adequate to permit a decision on the
issue. Second, there must be different counsel to make the argument. Both of these
conditions are present in this case. The first condition is met in this case because the
record from the lower courts will not be any different if the issue is determined in this

1

See: State v. Archambeau, supra, at 923, footnote 5.

2

See Point II, infra.
8

court or as a result of a writ filed in the district court.

Second, new counsel now

represents petitioner.
The issue of ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal has not been addressed
by this court under either a federal or state constitutional analysis. The Supreme
Court held in Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963), that criminal defendants are
entitled to counsel in their first appeal of right. The ruling in the court of appeals in
the instant case was petitioner's first appeal of right.3

The right to counsel

necessarily includes the sixth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel.
Strickland v. Washington. 446 U.S. 668 (1984). In Butterfield v. Cook. 166 Utah
Adv. Rep. 21 (Utah App. 1992), the court of appeals held that the sixth amendment
guaranties criminal defendants the right to effective assistance of appellate counsel.
In Butterfield, the court assumed without discussion that the two prong test
from Strickland v. Washington, supra, is the appropriate test to determine whether a
defendant had been denied his right to effective assistance of appellate counsel. That
test requires a showing of both a deficient performance and that such deficiencies
were prejudicial. Other courts have held that in determining whether a particular
defendant has been denied effective assistance of appellate counsel, deficient
performance alone is sufficient to show a deprivation of that constitutional right. Gay
v. State. 288 Ark 589, 707 S.W.2d 320 (1986); People v. Valenzuela. 175 Cal App.

3

See: Article I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution and Utah Code Ann. §77-1-6
(1953 as amended).
9

3d 3 8 1 , 322 Cal. Rptr. 405 (1985); Commonwealth v. Wine. 694 S.W.2d 689 (Ky.
1985); and LOOP V. Solem. 398 N.W.2d 140 (S.D. 1986). That is a standard that this
court should adopt under Article I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution. This court
should grant the petition to determine the appropriate standard to review claims of
denial of the right to effective assistance of counsel under both the Utah and federal
constitutions.
No matter which test this court adopts, it is clear that petitioner was denied his
right to effective assistance of appellate counsel in the instant case. With respect to
the search and seizure issue, counsel argued only the legality of the initial roadblock
stop. This was done in spite of the fact that the trial court found that there was a
voluntary consent to the search of the vehicle. By the time this case was argued in
the court of appeals, the necessity in making the attenuation argument was well
settled.4 Furthermore, counsel for the co-defendant briefed that issue and raised it
at oral argument.
argument.

Finally, there was no tactical advantage in failing to raise the

Without arguing attenuation or dissipation of the taint of the illegal

roadblock, the consent to search makes the evidence seized admissible.
The issue of prejudice is clearly shown from the result in the co-defendant's
case. As previously noted, the rulings from the court of appeal in these cases were

4

State v. Arrovo, supra: State v. Robinson. 797 P.2d 431 (Utah App. 1990); State
v. Sims, supra: State v. Park, 810 P.2d 456 (Utah App.) cert. dgn. 171 Utah Adv.
Rep. 67 (Utah 1991); State v. Bobo, 803 P.2d 1268 (Utah App. 1990); State v.
Carter, 812 P.2d 460 (Utah App. 1991).

10

based on the same suppression hearing and joint ruling.5 In State v. Small, supra, the
attenuation issue was raised and the judgment and conviction were reversed. In
petitioner's case, the attenuation issue was not raised. The court held that the
roadblock stop was illegal, but the voluntary consent to the search of the vehicle
made the evidence admissible. Unquestionably, if the attenuation issue had been
raised below there is a reasonable probability that the result would be different. This
court should grant the petition for certiorari to review this issue.
CONCLUSION
This court should grant the petition for writ of certiorari to review the ruling of
the court of appeals on two questions. First, whether that court committed plain error
in refusing to address the attenuation issue of if exceptional circumstances required
that issue to be addressed. Second, whether petitioner was denied his constitutional
right to effective assistance of appellate counsel by the failure to raise that
attenuation issue.
DATED this

day of May, 1992.

G. FRED METOS
Attorney for Petitioner

5

That ruling is attached in the addendum.

11

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed/hand delivered
on this
day of May, 1992, to:
R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General for the State of Utah
236 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
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ADDENDUM

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
*******

iTE OF UTAH,

)

Plaintiff,

Case Number

88-2413

)
)

IUEL THOMAS SMALL, and DENNIS
)ULDERBLADE,
Defendants,

RULING

)

)
********

This matter
just,

1989

on

came before the Court on the 4th day of

defendant's

motion

to suppress.

The

parties

offered certain testimony, a witness was called and testified,
3 counsel presented their arguments to the Court.

The Court,

zing taken the matter under advisement, and having diligently
isidered all of the evidence before it, now enters this:
RULING
On

September

29,

1988, the Utah

Highway

Patrol,

in

ijunction with the Millard County Sheriff's Office conducted a
adblock on a flat section of Interstate Highway 15, £outh of
llmore.

Notice

of

the

checkpoint

was

duly

given

fore in the local newspaper of general circulation.
tting the roadblock, the officers were briefed and
check

for proper driver's

license and vehicle

one

week

Prior to
instructed

registration.

During the roadblock, all cars were stopped.

Pursuant

:o the roadblock, defendants were stopped.

During the stop, the

>fficer

shove a

present

observed

defendant

Small

>etween the front seats of the car-

plastic

bag

The officer checked both

lefendants' identification and determined that the car was not
egistered to either defendant.
lispatch

regarding

While awaiting confirmation from

registration,

the

officer

asked

defendants

rhether there were any firearms, alcohol, or drugs in the car.
l

he response was in the negative.

ermission to search the vehicle.

The officer

then requested

Consent was given.

As defendant Shoulderblade exited the car, the officer
oticed

a gun under

assenger
uantity
irearms.

the front seat.

compartment
of

drugs,
In

the

of

the

drug
course

Subsequent search of the

vehicle

revealed

paraphernalia,
of

the

a

money,

search

of

substantial
and

the

loaded

passenger

ompartment, the officer asked defendants if they knew anything
bout the firearms or the drugs.
egative.

Defendants responded

They were subsequently arrested

in the

and were apprised of

heir rights before any further attempt at questioning.
As the officer

searched

the passenger

compartment of

hie vehicle, he smelled what he believed to be raw marijuana.
jbsequently,

opened

the

trunk

and

found

more

drugs

He
and

sraphernalia.
The evidence presented indicates that the roadblock was
^operly instituted at a fixed point as indicated in Delaware v.

flat area and was highly visible.

By allowing officers to

>ck licenses and vehicle registration, advanced a legitimate
rernmental purpose as required in United States v. McFayden,
i F.2d 1306 (D-C. Cir. 1989)As

further

required

in

McFayden,

there

was

no

jcretion on the part of officers stopping the cars—all were
juired to stop.

While there is some question as to whether all

the large trucks were stopped at the roadblock, there was no
Bar testimony that they were not stopped.

The court notes that

* Tenth Circuit has ruled that letting certain vehicles through
3 roadblock unchecked

is not, per se, an unlawful practice.

ited States v. Corral, 823 F.2d 1389 (10th Cir. 1987).

In any

*nt, it is undisputed that all passenger vehicles were stopped.
Questioning

as

part

of

an

initial

stop

does

not

rmally rise to the level of a custodial interrogation.

The

ah

not

Supreme

Court

has

held

that

Miranda

warnings

are

guired for investigation and interview pursuant to determining
ether a crime has been committed.

Salt Lake City v. Carner,

4 P.2d 1168, 1170 (Utah 1983).
The factors required for a Miranda warning under Carner
e not present-

Here questioning as to the contents of the car

s made as the officer awaited information from the dispatcher
lative to vehicle registration.

Questioning made during the

arcti of the vehicle was not accusatory.

Any interrogation if

can be called that was brief and informal.

See Carner, at

Lght during the check that created a reasonable suspicion that
le occupants were engaged

in some criminal activity

(Carner)•

le uncontroverted testimony is that the defendants were properly
3vised of their rights before further attempts at questioning.
All
^cation,

of

the

legitimate

above

factors: notice

purpose

of

the

of

stop,

the

stop,

training

of

its
the

fficers, the minimal intrusion by the officers unless there was
) articulateble and reasonable suspicion,

establish a minimum

public inconvenience.
Defendants

gave

permission

)nsent was never withdrawn.
le trunk was

to

(and there

the

vehicle.

As such, the subsequent search of

reasonable and proper.

)mehow defective,

search

Even if the consent was

is no evidence that this is the

lse) this court believes that due to the evidence found in the
issenger compartment and the smell of marijuana, the officer had
obable cause to search the trunk space.

See State v. Earl, 716

2d 803 (Utah 1986).
Based
chicle

stop,

Iministered.

on the foregoing, the Court concludes

that the

search,

properly

and

subsequent

arrest

were

The Court therefore denies defendants' motion to

ippress.
DATED at Provo, Utah this

*2- $

GEORGE &
Dexter Anderson
*M 2

T

J

»1

day of August, 1989.

/

BALLIF, JUDGE
'

This opinion is subject to revision before
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
ooOoo
State of Utah,

MAR 121992

%bjyW>^—
"*1tyary T \k)onan
Clerk ^ we Court
Utah Co j/t of Appeals

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Publication)

Plaintiff and Appellee,
Case No. 900288-CA

v.
Dennis Shoulderblade,
Defendant and Appellant.

F I L E D
(March 1 2 f 1992)

Fourth District, Millard County
The Honorable George E. Ballif
Attorneys:

Milton T. Harmon, Nephi, for Appellant
R. Paul Van Dam, Marian Decker, and David B.
Thompson, Salt Lake City, for Appellee

Before Judges Billings, Jackson, and Russon.
JACKSON, Judge:
This is an appeal from a trial courts denial of appellant
Dennis Shoulderblade,s motion to suppress certain evidence that
was obtained as a result of a roadblock and subsequent search of
the vehicle he was driving. We affirm.
Shoulderblade has not challenged the trial court's findings
of fact on appeal. Therefore, we adopt the following facts.
On September 29, 1988, the Utah Highway Patrol, in conjunction
with the Millard County Sheriff's office, conducted a roadblock
in Millard County, Utah, on a section of Interstate 15.
Approximately fifteen officers were assigned to operate the
roadblock. They were instructed to check for driver's licenses
and vehicle registration. In addition, the officers were told to
further question anyone who looked suspicious.
During the roadblock, all vehicles were stopped, including
the vehicle Shoulderblade was driving. Lemuel Small was a
passenger in that vehicle. Officer Jeffrey Whatcott, W!K>
executed the stop, testified that both Small and Shoulderblade
produced valid identification. The vehicle was not registered to
either Small or Shoulderblade. Small told the officer that the

vehicle belonged to a friend of his. The officer sought
confirmation of registration through radio dispatch. He also
asked Small and Shoulderblade if there were any firearms,
alcohol, or drugs in the vehicle. Both replied in the negcitive.
Officer Whatcott then requested permission to search the veihicle.
Small consented. Both Small and Shoulderblade were arresteid
after a substantial quantity of drugs, drug paraphernalia,
firearms, and cash was found in the vehicle. Officer Whatcott
continued to search the vehicle, and upon smelling marijuana,
opened the trunk of the vehicle and discovered more drugs and
paraphernalia.
Small and Shoulderblade were charged in an amended
information with several counts of possession of controlled
substances. Both defendants filed motions to suppress the
evidence that was found in the vehicle. The motions were based
on the alleged illegality of the roadblock. The trial court
concluded that the roadblock was instituted in a lawful manner.
The court further held that Miranda warnings were not required
under the facts before it, and that any interrogation that took
place was brief and informal. The uncontroverted testimony
indicated that both Small and Shoulderblade were properly advised
of their rights before further attempts at questioning them took
place.
The trial court made the following findings: Small and
Shoulderblade consented to the search of the vehicle; the consent
was never withdrawn; even if the consent were found to be somehow
defective, there was probable cause to search the trunk of the
vehicle. Based on the foregoing, the court denied the motions to
suppress.
Small and Shoulderblade were tried by a jury on February 16,
1990. The jury convicted Small of one count of possession of a
controlled substance (cocaine), a third degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 1988), and
two counts of possession of a controlled substance with intent to
distribute (methamphetamine and marijuana), a second and a third
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(iv)
(Supp. 1988).l Shoulderblade appeals the trial court's denial of
his motion to suppress the evidence found as a result of the
search.
Shoulderblade first asserts that the roadblock at which he
was stopped violated his constitutional right .against
1. The current versions of the statutes under which Shoulderblade
was convicted are codified at Utah Code Ann. V 58-37-8 (Supp.
1992) .

unreasonable searches and seizures. The State concedes that the
roadblock in question does not pass muster under the federal
constitution, and therefore we reverse the trial court/s
determination that the roadblock was conducted in a legal manner.
Shoulderblade did not argue before the trial court, or
before this court, that the consent given to search the vehicle
was involuntary, or that it was insufficiently attenuated from
the illegal roadblock to justify the search. As the State points
out, while a nonattenuation argument was unavailable to
Shoulderblade in the trial court, because, as acknowledged in
State v. Sims, 808 P.2d 141, 150 (Utah App. 1991), cert, pending,
"then-standing decisions effectively held that a non-coerced
search consent, by itself, purged the taint of a primary
illegality," jjd. at 150, the argument was available when this
case was briefed for appeal. However, Shoulderblade has failed
to articulate such an argument before this court.
Therefore, in light of the trial courts uncontested finding
that consent was given to search the vehicle, we affirm the trial

court's denial of Shoulderblade's motion to suppress on the
ground that the challenged evidence was obtained during a valid
consent search.2

Norman H. Jackson^Judge

WE CONCUR:

Judith M. Billings, Judge

Leonard H. Russon, Judge

2. Shoulderblade also asserts because the evidence was seized as
a result of interrogations which violated his right against selfincrimination, the evidence is inadmissible. Nothing in his
statement of facts, however, comes close to describing any
interrogation that might have taken place, or what;, if any
incriminating statements were obtained therefrom. Further,
the trial court found that the questioning that took place during
the search of the vehicle was "not accusatory," and that the
uncontroverted testimony indicated that Shoulderblade was advised
of his constitutional rights following his arrest. Shoulderblade
has not cited us to anywhere in the record that disputes this
finding.
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This opinion is subject to revision before
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
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JACKSON, Judge:
This is an appeal from a trial court's denial of appellant
Lemuel T. Small's motion to suppress evidence obtained as a
result of a roadblock and subsequent search of the vehicle in
which Small was a passenger. We reverse and remand for a new
trial in which the evidence seized from the vehicle is to be
suppressed.
FACTS
Small does not challenge the trial court's findings of fact.
Therefore, for purposes of this appeal the facts are as follows.
On September 29, 1988, the Utah Highway Patrol, in
conjunction with the Millard County Sheriff's office, conducted a
roadblock in Millard County, Utah, on a section of Interstate 15.
Notice of the roadblock was published in the Millard County
Chronicle one week before the roadblock was instituted and signs
were placed on the freeway, warning drivers that they would have
to stop. Approximately fifteen officers were assigned to operate
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the jgoadblock. They were instructed to check for drivers'
licefpes and vehicle registration. In addition, the officers
were told to further question anyone who looked suspicious.
During the roadblock, all vehicles were stopped, including
the vehicle in which Small was a passenger. The vehicle was
driven by Dennis Shoulderblade. Officer Jeffrey Whatcott, who
executed the stop, testified that both Small and Shoulderblade
produced valid identification. The vehicle was not registered to
either Small or Shoulderblade. Small told the officer that the
vehicle belonged to a friend of his. Officer Whatcott sought
confirmation of registration through radio dispatch. He also
asked Small and Shoulderblade if there were any firearms,
alcohol, or drugs in the vehicle. Both replied in the negative.
Officer Whatcott requested permission to search the vehicle, and
Sma11 consented.
In searching the vehicle, Officer Whatcott located a
substantial quantity of drugs, drug paraphernalia, firearms, and
cash. Both Small and Shoulderblade were arrested. Officer
Whatcott continued to search the vehicle, and upon smelling
marijuana, opened the trunk of the vehicle and discovered more
drugs and paraphernalia.
In an amended information, Small and Shoulderblade were
charged with several counts of possession of controlled
substances. Both defendants filed motions to suppress the
evidence that was found in the vehicle. The motions were based
on the alleged illegality of the roadblock. The trial court
concluded that the roadblock was instituted in a lawful manner.
The trial court also found that Small and Shoulderblade consented
to the search of the vehicle, and that the consent was never
withdrawn. Based on the foregoing, the court denied the motions
to suppress.
Small and Shoulderblade were tried by a jury on February 16,
1990. The jury convicted Small of one count of possession of a
controlled substance (cocaine), a third degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 1988), and
two counts of possession of a controlled substance with intent to
distribute (methamphetamine and marijuana), a second and a third
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(iv)
(Supp. 1988).*

1. The current versions of the statutes under which Small was
convicted are codified at Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (Supp. 1992) .
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ISSUES
Small appeals the denial of his motion to suppress,
contending that (1) the roadblock stop of the vehicle in which he
was riding was illegal; and (2) because there was insufficient
attenuation between the illegal roadblock and any consent given,
all evidence discovered subsequent to the roadblock stop should
have been suppressed by the trial court.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In reviewing a challenge to a lower court's suppression
ruling, we will not reverse the findings of fact underlying that
ruling unless they are clearly erroneous. State v. Palmer, 803
P.2d 1249, 1251 (Utah App. 1990r»»cert. denied, 802 P.2d 748
(Utah 1991). Those factual findings are clearly erroneous only
if they are against the clear weight of the evidence. State v.
Castner, 179 Utah Adv. Rep. 11, 12 (Utah App. 1992); State v.
Leonard, 175 Utah Adv. Rep. 49, 50 (Utah App. 1991). The issue
of the constitutionality of a roadblock stop is a matter of law
which we review with no particular deference to the trial court's
conclusions. State v. Sims, 808 P.2d 141, 144 (Utah App. 1991),
cert, pending.
LEGALITY OF THE ROADBLOCK
Small asserts that the roadblock at which he was stopped
violated his constitutional right against unreasonable searches
and seizures. Specifically, Small alleges that the roadblock did
not meet the objective standards required by the Fourth Amendment
of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 14 of
the Utah Constitution.
At the time of its denial of Small's motion to suppress, the
trial court did not have the benefit of the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496
U.S. 444, 110 S. Ct. 2481 (1990). The State concedes that the
roadblock in the present case fails to meet the requirements for
roadblocks set out in Sitz. We agree. Thus, the roadblock stop
violated Small's Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable
seizures, and the trial court's conclusion to the contrary is
reversed.2
2. Because the roadblock does not pass muster under the federal
constitution, we need not consider its validity under the state
constitution. See State v. Park, 810 P.2d 456, 458 n.l (Utah
App.), cert, denied. 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991).
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ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE FOLLOWING ILLEGAL ROADBLOCK
Having determined that the roadblock stop of the vehicle was
unconstitutional, we must now determine if the subsequent
warrantless search was nevertheless valid. Relying on State v.
Sims, 808 P.2d 141 (Utah App. 1991), cert, pending. Small
asserts that while he consented to the search of the vehicle, his
consent was obtained as a result of an unbroken chain of events
that began with the illegal roadblock, and that as a result, his
consent is not valid.
The State has the burden of establishing that the evidence
obtained following the illegal roadblock was not tainted by
showing the consent given was sufficiently attenuated from that
illegality. See Sims, 808 P.2d at 151.
Two factors determine whether consent to
a search is lawfully obtained following
initial police misconduct. The inquiry
should focus on whether the consent was
voluntary and whether the consent was
obtained by police exploitation of the prior
illegality. Evidence obtained in searches
following police illegality must meet both
tests to be admissible.
State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684, 688 (Utah 1990) (citing 3 W.
LaFave, Search and Seizure § 8.2(d), at 190 (2d ed. 1987)). The
State argues that because the trial court did not make explicit
findings on either prong of the Arroyo test, we should remand for
the trial court to make detailed findings to support the consent
determination. We decline the State's invitation to remand for
further findings3 because, as this court stated in State v.
Castner, 179 Utah Adv. Rep. 11, 14 & n.3 (Utah App. 1992), when
the record at the suppression hearing is sufficiently detailed
and there are no contested facts, we are in as good a position as
the trial court to decide the taintedness/attenuation issue.

3. We acknowledge that fact-sensitive issues such as consent are
best resolved by the trial court. However, in this case counsel
for both Small and for the State indicated at oral argument that
there were no facts in dispute and it was doubtful that any
further enlightening facts would be forthcoming.
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A. Voluntary Consent
Voluntariness of consent is a fact sensitive question and we
look to the totality of circumstances to ascertain if there is
clear and positive testimony that the consent was unequivocal and
freely given. Castner, 179 Utah Adv. Rep. at 13; Carter, 812
P.2d at 467; State v. Grovier, 808 P.2d 133, 136 (Utah App.
1991); State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880, 887-88 (Utah App.), cert,
denied, 800 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1990). The trial court determined
that Small had consented to the searches. Small does not
challenge that ruling on appeal. However, the trial court did
not address whether or not the consent was voluntary. This is an
important first prong in the Arroyo analysis. We find nothing in
the undisputed facts that suggests Small's consent was not
voluntary.
B. Dissipation of Taint
The conclusion that there was voluntary consent does not end
our inquiry as we must also determine if the consent was
untainted by the prior illegality. Castner, 179 Utah Adv. Rep.
at 14. "We examine several factors to determine if there has
been an exploitation of a prior illegality: temporal proximity
of the illegality and the evidence sought to be suppressed, the
presence of intervening factors, and the purpose and flagrancy of
the misconduct.11 id.; accord Sims, 808 P. 2d at 150; Arroyo, 796
P.2d at 690-91 n.4.
This case is indistinguishable from Sims. The record
demonstrates a very short period of time elapsed between Small's
stop at the roadblock and Officer Whatcott's request to search.
As for intervening factors, none exist. The consent was obtained
during the ongoing illegal roadblock stop. On the uncontroverted
facts before us, we conclude that Small's consent to have the
vehicle searched was not sufficiently attenuated to dissipate the
taint of the illegal roadblock.

CONCLUSION
Small's convictions are reyersed and the case is remanded to
the trial court for proceedings in accord with this opinion.

Norman H. Jackson, ^fudge

WE CONCUR:

Judith M. Billings, Judge

Leonard H. Russon, Judge

